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Abstract 
 
In recent years advancements have been made in computer hardware security to 
circumnavigate the threat of malicious hardware. Threats come in several forms during the 
development and overall life cycle of computer hardware and I aim to highlight those key points. 
I will illustrate the various ways in which attackers exploit flaws in a chip design, or how 
malicious parties take advantage of the many steps required to design and fabricate hardware. 
Due to these exploits, the industry and consumers have suffered damages in the form of financial 
loss, physical harm, breaches of personal data, and a multitude of other problems. 
Many are under the impression that such damages and attacks are only carried out at a 
software level. Because of this, flaws in chip design, fabrication, and the large scale of transistors 
on chips have often been overlooked as a means of exploitation. However, as is the trend in 
cyberattacks when one door is locked attackers look to gain an entrance with any possible means. 
Fortunately, strides have been made in closing those doors, however now that malicious 
attackers have been made aware of these openings the aim is to mitigate or even abolish the 
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The malpractice of malicious hardware is spread throughout many stages in the life cycle 
of a chip. For many years the general expectation was that cyberattacks would be carried out at a 
software or firmware level. We largely ignored the risk imposed upon the very machines that 
execute the software we focused our security efforts on. As a former intern with Centauri, I 
gained a firsthand look at the design flow of an SoC design and was made aware of the need for 
an increase in hardware-level security. Through case studies and my work in physical 
implementation, I gained knowledge of where exploitations occur and the ways they can be 
handled. 
Modern hardware designs are a culmination of millions of lines of HDL code, toolkits, 
scripts to facilitate design software, and modules that are outsourced across multiple vendors. 
Because of the complexity of a chip’s design and its long development cycle, hardware is 
susceptible to a multitude of attacks. One major facet of hardware's vulnerability is its inability 
to receive low-level repairs once it is in the hands of the consumer. Software on the other hand 
can be modified to withstand attacks in the form of patches rolled out by development teams 
[10]. 
Without the ability to effectively “patch hardware” the only solution to hardware that has 
made it to maket with malicious circuitry comes in the form of recalls. Companies forced to 
recall products suffer damages that can range upwards of hundreds of millions of dollars. To 
cover potential financial losses the integrated circuit design industry has seen a major shift 
between all entities involved. 
With this thesis I aim to briefly highlight the dangers and risks involved in integrated 
circuit design. After learning how hardware can be modified we can then evaluate case studies 
and the ways this industry has transformed to mitigate financial losses and called for higher 
levels of trust. 
1.2 An Overview of Attacks During a Chip’s Life Cycle 
 
From a piece of hardware’s inception threats are present in the form of 
outsourced third-party IP that designers utilize in their schematics. In a design house 
third-party modules are commonly referred to as “black boxes” because design teams 
don’t have the means to easily inspect foreign intellectual property. Therein lies a huge 
leap of faith in which designers must have trust that their vendors don’t sell them 
compromised designs. However, this is only the earliest critical stage. 
While not as common a problem due to internal trust within a company, 
malicious workers have direct access to the entire design flow of a chip. This allows for 
the planting of malicious code, and transistors that can alter the functionality or 
intended use of a piece of hardware. Because of the massive scale of the code involved 
in designing an integrated circuit and the number of transistors present in modern 
processors these changes are at risk of going unnoticed. This results in a chip that has 
been approved for fabrication and once physically created will have undetected exploits 
ready for attackers to take advantage of. 
If a design is approved for physical manufacturing and is free of nefarious 
modifications, one of the most vulnerable times in a chip’s life cycle is in fabrication. 
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outsourcing to offshore foundries to reduce costs [21]. During this stage, changes to the physical 
elements of the chip can be made. 
While attacks to hardware post-development are different in nature, there is still a high 
level of risk involved. Consumers with the same intent as malicious workers in foundries now 
have “finalized” chips that can be repurposed. The electronics counterfeit market is immensely 




Before we can further evaluate the different stages of development we must first 
understand what a Trojan is. In the world of computing we define the word as, camouflaged 
software that appears to be working as intended, but contains malicious processes. Popular 
definitions however fail to recognize the existence of hardware Trojans. Much like their software 
counterparts they infiltrate computer systems and do not cause immediate noticeable damage. 





Any hardware trojan can be broken down into 3 principal characteristics: physical 
attributes, activation method, and action [19] as show in Figure 2. 
Physical Attributes: Defining physical features of a Trojan include type, size, distribution, and 
structure. Type can be categorized into two distinct Trojans, functional and parametric. 
Functional Trojans are implemented by either inserting or removing transistors and gates. 
Parametric Trojans are Trojans that are created through the altering of existing physical features 
on the chip. The size of a Trojan is measured not by its physical makeup on the chip but by the 
number of modifications that have been made to implement the Trojan. These modifications 
count HDL level additions or deletions of gates, and physical altercations of chips. The 
distribution of a Trojan is measured by the density of a Trojan on a chip. Modifications can be in 
close proximity on a layout or dispersed throughout the chip. This all depends on the available 
empty space in a design. Structure refers to the detectable physical footprint of a Trojan. Because 
parametric Trojans alter preexisting design elements they are harder to detect. However 
functional Trojans that are larger and more densely distributed can be detected by localized 
power spikes on a chip. Loosely distributed Trojans require longer wire lengths to interlink 
components and have a higher chance of altering expected timing delay results on a chip. 
Because of these two detection methods, attackers have had to create new techniques to forego 
detection. 
Activation Method: The next characteristic of a Trojan is how it is activated. Activation can be 
divided into two categories, external or internal activation. In external activation, attackers can 
activate a Trojan at the time of their choosing. This is done by sending external signals to a chip 
that are input through onboard receivers and commence the Trojan's internal attack. Wang 
furthermore breaks down internal activation into two subcategories, always-on and condition- 
based. Always-on Trojans are usually of the type parametric. This is because to remain activated 
physical changes to nodes or wires must be made. Condition-based activation if undetected can 
be compared to a ticking time bomb. Without knowledge of the existence of the Trojan a near 
limitless amount of conditions could activate it. Wang provides examples such as chip voltage 
sensors, external temperature and humidity sensors, or internal logic states. Surprisingly, always 
on Trojans are harder to detect. Because of their parametric type, only subtle physical changes to 
the chip are made. Condition-based Trojans, however, require the addition of logic components 
to be activated thus they are always consuming power, or the increased loads on wires change 
the expected timing delay results. 
Action: Lastly Trojans can be characterized by their actions and in this characteristic there are 
three subcategories, modify-function, modify-specification, and transmit-info. Modify-function 
Trojans change the expected logical behavior of a design. Modify-function capabilities by their 
nature are very broad in range and can result in numerous types of attacks. Modify-specification 
Trojans once again represent parametric Trojans because they change physical features on a chip. 
The capabilities are generally limited to the eventual failure of a chip. Transmit-info Trojans 
steal information at a hardware level such as encryption keys or passwords and then send them 
back to the attacker. 
2.2 Example Trojan 
 
Because of the increased complexity present in modern hardware functional type Trojans 
can now be inserted into an ocean of transistors. One of the earliest research examples was the 
Illinois Malicious Processor [12] or IMP for short. The IMP was a variant of the Aeroflex 
Gaisler Leon 3 and was able to function as a Leon 3 until its Trojan was externally activated. By 
adding 1,341 gates into the design researchers were able to carry out attacks such as encryption 
key stealing, password stealing, and privilege escalation. The Trojan present in the IMP was 
externally activated through a corrupt network packet and subsequently received commands 
from the network which were then executed on the processor. 
Surely 1,341 additional gates would not go unnoticed. Designs are comprised of hundreds 
if not thousands of files, millions of lines of code, and gate counts already in the scale of millions 
that are projected to increase. Because of the sheer magnitude of a design, a relatively small 
Trojan sophisticated in design can carry out a lot with only a little. 
 
3. Analysis of Attacks 
 
3.1 Third-Party IP 
 
Because of the time and cost involved with designing an SoC design, designers often 
utilize third-party intellectual property. This practice is used to avoid the unnecessary design of 
modules that are meant to be reused several times within a design. Design houses save money 
and internal design efforts, and instead utilize a module that is proven to work. A high level of 
trust must be placed on the third-party vendor to supply modules that work effectively and 
safely, but in some cases third-party IP arrives compromised. Before designers are even 
considering final tape-outs and physical fabrication they are at risk of integrating malicious 
hardware into their designs. These Trojans are generally classified as functional Trojans. They 
are capable of causing serious damage by being present in a mere 0.1% - 0.5% of the overall 




When organizations utilize third-party 
intellectual property, modules present 
in the design are quite literally a “black 
box”. To visualize what a physical 
implementation engineer is creating on 
design tools Figure 3 is the floorplan of 
a Rocket Core that I designed. Pink 
modules are spaces reserved for 
modules designed in-house, and 
modules labeled "Black Box" are third- 
party SRAM and DRAM modules. Because these black boxes cannot be inspected easily with 
EDA tools, designers are unable to see if extra transistors are present before sending their 
designs to foundries. Detection then comes in the form of rigorous simulation tests to ensure no 
anomalies are present. These anomalies could present themselves in the form of irregular power 
usage or timing irregularities due to additional added cable routes between malicious transistors 
[15]. 
Because of these risks, designers are left with the task of testing and verifying third-party 
IP if they want to ensure the security of their system. While time-consuming, in the grand 
scheme of development, testing saves designers more time and resources than having to design 
these modules in-house. 
3.2 In House Attacks 
 
In-house attacks can be incredibly rare but that does not mean they’re impossible. These 
attacks are once again carried out during the design phase of a chip but are much harder to 
implement and hide effectively. Security in design houses can be achieved through several 
avenues, the first being selective hiring. Because of the high levels of suspicion in the industry of 
physical chip design hiring is and should be taken very seriously. Failed background checks or 
failure to obtain security clearance can deter malicious users. Previous employment with 
competing organizations is also taken into consideration. However, if someone with malicious 
intent were to be employed as part of a design team he/she would be one of many working on a 
design. With multiple personnel on a team to hold each other accountable attacks can be detected 
during the many steps of the design phase. During the design of a chip, every change and 
simulation is logged. Design repositories flag alterations to code for peers to review, and during 
the many design generations and tape-out reviews, nearly every aspect of a layout is observed 
closely. Even though attacks are not impossible internally within organizations, the most critical 
attack point before fabrications is present in third-party intellectual property. 
3.3 Fabrication Attacks 
 
Before packaging and consumer selling this is the final step of production in which 
hardware is at risk of being maliciously modified. During this phase, designs have been finalized 
and sent for fabrication. With many modern design houses being "fabless" and the cost of 
running a foundry being so high, the most common method of turning digital designs into 
tangible designs has been to send final tape-outs to foundries. Under the assumption that a Trojan 
was not inserted through third-party intellectual property or in-house, this is now the most  
critical stage of a chip's production. Because many foundries are overseas or do not allow direct 
oversight of production the design is now completely in the hands of yet another organization. 
With that comes an extreme level of trust, and attempts at preventing modifications. 
By creating a densely packed tape-out designers leave little room for the addition of 
gates. If there are areas on the design where gates can be modified the additional gates must be 
connected to specific modules which means extra wiring through multiple metal layers. 
Additionally, attackers must be able to keep the chip fully operational after production until their 
Trojan needs to be activated [18]. With so much complexity one might wonder, “Why is this 
such a dangerous phase of production”. After having explored functional type trojans that add 
gates at an HDL or RTL level, we must further explore parametric type Trojans. While they may 
not be as sophisticated as functional trojans that can steal memory information or leave 
backdoors, their damage can be just as catastrophic. Take for example a missile detection system 
that has worked flawlessly for some time and then suddenly malfunctions due to modifications 
made in fabrication. 
A parametric Trojan is created by modifying physical aspects on the chip. During the 
development phase wire sizes, lengths, and connections are all meticulously planned out. By 
altering these physical aspects of the chip attackers can craft dopant level Trojans. By altering 
the dopant concentration on an input pin of a logic gate attackers can change the logical input 
from a 0 to a 1 or vice versa [21]. For example, a CMOS transistor's strength is determined by its 
width. By reducing the area that is doped on a transistor it is possible to change the width and 
therefore its strength. While more complex doping mechanisms have been explored the simplest 
method is altering the dopant concentration of the active area of a transistor to a smaller area. In 
the following diagram, we see an altered mask that has changed the dopant concentration of the 
P-well to reduce its overall size. In Figure 4 below [9] we can see how forcing the dopant 




Because these are existing circuits and gates, dopant level Trojans are extremely hard to detect 
and leave a very small footprint in the finished design. 
3.4 Counterfeiting 
 
Once a product has left the foundry and has been extensively tested by the design team it 
is now susceptible to aftermarket modifications and counterfeiting. Out of the hands of the 
design team, attackers can make any modifications they wish and pass off their products as either 
"new” or alter the markings on the printed circuit board to sell the product as something else 
entirely. Through various techniques such as sandblasting and acid washes [6] counterfeiters are 
able to salvage potentially decades-old components and resell them. With the limited lifespan of 
computer hardware, it's easy to see how dangerous it is to integrate these counterfeited parts into 
a computer system. 
In a 2011 Senate Hearing [17] it was reported that approximately 15% of all electronic 
parts purchased by The Pentagon as either spare or replacement parts were counterfeit. With a 3 
in 20 chance of having a component present in systems meant to protect civilians the risk is very 
high, and that’s solely the statistic for the government sector. When we take into consideration 
the possibility of counterfeits in medical technology or transportation we begin to question the 
products that we as average consumers own or are impacted by in our lives. 
To further highlight the gravity of the situation I present to you the 2014 arrest of Marc 
Heera. In 2014 the FBI arrested Heera for selling cloned Hondata s300’s. Hondata, a popular 
aftermarket Honda automobile modification, manufactures hardware that can bypass security 
measures in a Honda vehicle. The chip is capable of changing the limits put in place by Honda in 
the Honda engine computer. Enthusiasts can unlock more 
horsepower and fine-tune their vehicles to get the most out of 
them. Having a piece of hardware that already has so much 
power over your vehicle be modified is a recipe for disaster. 
Heera was able to carry this out by paying Chinese companies 
to manufacture these chips and once received he passed them 
off as genuine by labeling them and packaging them just as 
Hondata does. In Figure 5 to the right the genuine Hondata 
part is pictured below and the counterfeit above [16]. 
While these "attacks" differ from the Trojan-based 
Figure 5 
 
attacks we have explored so far, it is important to recognize them to understand how vulnerable 
our modern computer hardware is. With so much focus placed on dated legacy software, we need 
to consider how dated or genuine our equipment is. With more scrutiny on the parts used across 
multiple different spaces, government and personal alike, we can mitigate the risk to consumers. 
4. Effects on Industry 
 
4.1 Financial Evaluation and the Need for Trust 
 
Assessment of damages suffered by component designers is a hard metric to measure 
accurately because of the very nature of Trojans. A well-placed and designed functional or 
parametric Trojan can go undetected for a long time, only to reveal itself until its activation 
method. Because of this, we can instead explore the changes that have been made to the 
integrated circuit industry and the different countermeasures that have been established to 
circumnavigate the issues of trust. Before doing so we must first identify the three third-party 
entities that an SoC design house establishes contracts with for development: foundries, IP 
vendors, and EDA tool vendors. 
Foundries: Foundries are fabrication facilities that manufacture components once they have 
received tape-outs from SoC designers. Foundries have multibillion-dollar facilities and for this 
reason many SoC design organizations outsource. Currently 5 companies make up 54% of all 
global wafer capacity. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company or TSMC for short is the 
second largest semiconductor manufacturing company with a 13.1% share of global wafer 
production [8]. In 2019 TSMC was responsible for the production of 10,761 products and 
serviced 499 different customers [7] across 17 different foundries predominantly located in 
Taiwan and China. In May of 2020 TSMC proposed to build a fab in Arizona with the total 
expenditure of the project estimated to cost 12 billion dollars with plans for expansion or 
modification to wafer production [11]. Without considering US taxes it is estimated that wafer 
production in the Arizona fab will be approximately 7% more expensive than wafer production 
in Fab 18 located in Taiwan [11]. These plans came about to ease issues of trust within the US 
government. With these expenditure estimates and production cost increase figures one can 
assess the lengths that organizations go to and resources foundries expend to establish trust with 
their customers. 
IP Vendors: Third-party intellectual property vendors are one of the two primary concerns in IC 
design and production. Because of the high possibility of functional Trojan insertion from 
external entities into an SoC design trust between vendors and customers is crucial. Major IP 
vendors include companies such as ARM, Synopsys, and Cadence with a reported combined 
64.9% market share in 2019 [14]. Analyzing costs of IP usage can be very complex due to the 
large variety of costs and vendor business models. Factors include proposed usage by SoC 
designers, licensing fees, royalties, time of usage, and technologies purchased. An upfront cost 
with ARM to utilize their Cortex-A5 CPU begins at $75,000, on top of that cost there is an 
additional $50,000 licensing fee. Their higher-end package which includes more resources and is 
an annual package has an upfront cost of $200,000 with licensing fees assessed per use case [20]. 
These numbers however are only upfront costs and licensing fees, because ARM's licensing 
terms are secret a further breakdown of costs is harder to achieve. In Q4 of 2020 alone ARM 
acquired 579 million dollars in net sales [3]. With a 40% share of the market and their reported 
quarterly profits, we can evaluate the amount of trust placed on reputable IP vendors to deliver 
products that will come free of security risks. 
EDA Tool Vendors: Electronic design automation tools or EDA tools for short are tools utilized 
by SoC designers to facilitate IC design. The major vendors in this category are Synopsys, 
Cadence, Xilinx, and Altera. In SoC design designers often use multiple toolsets across different 
EDA vendors with factors in pricing being time used, tools utilized, and licenses granted to the 
organization. For example, an organization may purchase 5 licenses for synthesis tools, and 
another 3 for floor planning tools because of this it is again difficult to answer the question, 
"How much does an SoC design house spend on these tools?" Mistrust of an EDA tool vendor 
stems from software gathering more information than required of a design. 
In this IC market model diagram created by He Li and 
Jiliang Zhang [13], we can see how all of these parties are 
directly tied to the SoC designer and have an impact on the 
product that the end-user receives. At the center of it all is the 
SoC designer, who is at the mercy of these external threats. 




why designers must be on high alert and conduct rigorous testing throughout the entire 
development phase to ensure a safe and secure product for their end-users. 
4.2 A Bombing in Syria and the Emergence of Trust 
 
One of the very first calls to arms in the space of hardware security was the 2007 
bombing executed by Israel on Syria. The reason this bombing was under so much spotlight in 
the IC design industry was because of the failure of a Syrian radar that was supposed to alarm the 
Syrian military of the incoming bombing. Because this was before hardware was suspected of 
being at risk for attack nobody knew exactly what led to this failure. However, the consensus 
was that a functional Trojan inserted into the radar detection system contained a backdoor that 
allowed attackers to shut it off or alter its functionality long enough to carry out the bombing [2]. 
Because of a famous article published by Sally Adee, The Hunt for the Kill Switch, SoC 
designers were made more aware of the need for trusted electronics. 
Three months shortly after the bombing, DARPA, a research and development wing of 
The Pentagon, created the Trust in Integrated Circuits program. Initially when this program was 
created three separate government contractors were tested to meet the standards put forth by the 
program. Now because of the Trust in Integrated Circuits program facilities and contractors 
across the entire development process can receive accreditation from The Pentagon [1]. To 
receive accreditation organizations must meet the metrics put forth by The Pentagon and ensure 
that measures are being taken to provide secure computer components to the US Military. This 
program has led to a much higher level of accountability placed across all entities who wish to 




When we begin to look at methods and techniques to reduce the risk of hardware Trojans, 
we ask “How can we prevent this?” However complete elimination of the threat is very hard to 
achieve. For a design team to remove the risks of external entities and have a completely trusted 
chip they would need to design the entire chip from scratch and fabricate it themselves. As 
discussed in the financial evaluation this is not a feasible solution. We can instead make efforts 




The best way to prevent the insertion of Trojans is close monitoring of a design from start 
to finish. Because complete design and fabrication are not feasible, the emergence of trusted 
design houses has reduced the level of danger posed to the military sector. With small teams and 
a high level of accountability placed within them, consumers have increased faith that their 
product does not have a hidden agenda. However, fabrication attacks at offshore foundries are 
still a present risk. For this reason, designers have constructed methods to deter and detect 
modifications. 
To counteract malicious modification at the fabrication stage designers have begun to 
create their designs with virtually no empty spaces. While most attacks at fabrication come in the 
form of parametric Trojans, zero empty space mitigates the threat of functional type Trojans at 
fabrication. By adding functional filler cells that come at a negligible performance cost, 
designers can detect changes made to the integrated circuit at fabrication. Prefabrication tests 
give designers expected results to test for once they have their physical chip. Experiments 
conducted by Ba show that once the same inputs used pre-fabrication are used after 
modifications have been made, their expected signatures do not match [4]. 
The end product of functional filler cells results in post-fabrication testing, which would 
be better classified as a detection method. Because there are so many steps where designs could 




The least used detection method is destructive reverse engineering. By deconstructing a 
chip post-fabrication using chemical mechanical polishing we now have access to individual 
components within the chip [5]. We can then put these components under an electron microscope 
to analyze the chip and detect malicious modification methods, assuring that our chip is safe for 
consumer use. This process that inspects even the smallest of components however is very 
expensive requiring many techniques for analysis over a period of weeks or months. At the end 
of validation, you will have destroyed a single chip from an entire batch of manufactured chips. 
During fabrication only some samples may have been tampered with which calls for the 
deconstruction of all chips to verify their safety. For these reasons, reverse engineering is not an 
attractive detection method. Instead, we can conduct logic tests and side-channel analysis. 
Logic Tests: Using automatic test pattern generation or ATPG we can apply inputs to a chip and 
compare their outputs to expected results. This method originally designed to detect faulty chips 
can be applied to detect parametric Trojans. ATPG is run by EDA tools that have knowledge of 
existing routes and modules in the chip therefore finding hidden functional trojans through 
predetermined tests is not feasible[19]. Instead, we can test for rare combinational inputs using 
MERO. MERO is short for "multiple excitation of rare occurrence". By detecting low probability 
conditions and applying rare inputs we can trigger functional type Trojans [5]. Applying rare 
inputs to low probability nodes a sufficient number of times and activating conditional-based 
triggers is our best method of logical detection for functional trojans. 
Side-Channel Analysis: By observing the physical characteristics of an IC under nondestructive 
tests we can detect functional type Trojans. Observable side-channels include power anomalies, 
EMF variations, temperature variations, or execution times. As previously stated functional 
Trojans are constantly consuming power at some level to monitor for their activation methods. If 
we were to activate the power grid and observe the power spikes throughout, we could detect the 
power consumed by inserted malicious gates searching for their activation trigger [19]. We also 
can detect timing anomalies that present themselves when extra wiring is added. Because of the 
added gates and their need to be connected to existing components to affect the chip, longer 
routing is required for Trojans to work. We can isolate Trojans by applying rare inputs and 
flagging unexpected timing delays. 
Side-channel analysis however fails in one regard and that is the need for a “golden chip”. 
 
Golden chips can be defined as chips that are known to be free of any malicious tampering. By 
having a chip to compare to we have evidence that an anomaly is in fact an anomaly. The best 
method to obtaining a golden chip comes from destructive reverse engineering. By having fully 
analyzed a chip under a microscope and confirming the chip is unmodified, design houses have a 
baseline chip with which to perform their side-channel analysis. The other method for obtaining 
a golden chip would be through extensive logic testing however experimenting with every 
possible input combination would take many months on large-scale SoC designs. The solution to 
the golden chip method is temporal self-referencing [5]. 
By comparing transient current signatures across multiple different time windows one can 
reveal the existence of Trojans without a golden chip. When multiple state transitions are 
undergone, transient current signatures change across a span of time windows in modified 
circuits. Trojan free designs on the other hand have a constant signature when following 
sequential logic. Using tools that log all signatures we can compare current signatures to past 




The existence of malicious hardware should be taken into more consideration when 
evaluating risk in cybersecurity. With software and firmware being the focal point, we have 
largely omitted the need to evaluate the circuitry responsible for executing these processes. By 
dissecting a hardware Trojan into multiple parts and highlighting critical development phases we 
can take measures to prevent and detect malicious modifications. When these modifications go 
undetected the IC design industry suffers. 
From expensive products and contracts to high levels of mistrust we have experienced a 
shift in hardware design. Even more worrying is the existence of malicious hardware in current 
electronics. From counterfeit computer chips in the government and transportation vectors to 
Trojan infected missile detection systems the danger is present. With efforts placed on domestic 
manufacturing and trusted design houses, we have made strides in mitigating the risk. 
Sophisticated detection methods utilized by trusted design houses have restored faith in 
government contractors. Because of articles like “The Hunt for the Kill Switch” and news stories 
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